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NOTES
The Taxation of Stock Dividends and the Tax Reform
Act of 1969-Foreboding Implications and
Constitutional Uncertainties
I.

INTRODUCTION

Federal income taxation of stock dividends has followed a diverse
course. Since the introduction of a federal income tax on all stock
dividends in 1916, five major changes have occurred in this area. The
most recent of these changes is embodied in section 421 of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, which amends section 305 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.1 When the 1969 Amendments are compared with the
treatment of stock dividends under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
they can be viewed, in conjunction with the regulations issued in 1969
under the 1954 Code, as initiating a new era in the taxation of stock
dividends. Generally, the 1969 Amendments expand considerably the
scope of stock dividend taxation, and they reinstate the "proportionate
interest" test of stock dividend taxation, which was utilized by the courts
with great confusion prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code. Further,
the 1969 Amendments grant the Secretary of the Treasury broad power
to promulgate regulations under the new provisions. Although the
proposed regulations clarify to some extent the application of the new
code sections, 2 many problems will undoubtedly still arise. The sweeping
nature of the 1969 Amendments, for example, raises numerous questions
about the constitutionality of the taxation of certain stock dividends.
Moreover, the application of the "proportionate interest" test probably
will revive the troublesome problems encountered in the prior use of the
test. Since stock dividends have become an increasingly important tool
of corporate financial policy, which affects millions of shareholders 3 the
validity of the 1969 Amendments will probably be tested in the courts.
This Note, therefore, undertakes to delineate the effects of the 1969
Amendments on shareholders and corporations and to present several
1. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 421, 83 Stat. 614, amending INT. REV.
of 1954, § 305 [hereinafter referred to as 1969 Amendments].
2. Proposed regulations were issued on March 18, 1971. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.305, 36
Fed. Reg. 5221 (1971), reprinted in 7 P-H 1971 FED. TAXES 65,285.

CODE

3. See D. KEHL,

CORPORATE DIVIDENDS

173 (1941). Moody's financial service reports that

approximately 2,100 corporations issued stock dividends in 1969 and 1968.40 MooDY's
RECORD 164-66 (1969); 39 MOODY's DIVIDEND RECORD 163-65 (1968).
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arguments that may be used to challenge the constitutionality of this new
scheme of stock dividend taxation.' In order to properly analyze the
impact of the 1969 Amendments, a thorough familiarity with the history
of stock dividend taxation and the 1969 provisions is essential.
II.

HISTORY OF STOCK DIVIDEND TAXATION

The taxation of stock dividends has been characterized by
confusion and uncertainty that has pervaded both the judicial and
legislative branches of government. From this confusion three distinct
periods in the evolution of stock dividend taxation can be discerned.
A.

1913-1936: Eisnerv. Macomberand Its Progeny

The passage of the sixteenth amendment in 1913 empowered
Congress to tax an individual's income without apportionment among
the states.5 This enactment raised many tax problems, including the
question whether a stock dividend was income within the purview of the
amendment. The answer to this question was not long in coming. In the
Revenue Act of 1916, Congress included the cash value of all stock
dividends in a shareholder's net taxable income. 6 This legislative
pronouncement was directly contrary to the traditional view of the
courts and financial community, which regarded stock dividends as a
part of a shareholder's capital investment that did not change his interest
in the corporation. 7 The result of this congressional approach was
serious criticism that culminated in litigation before the Supreme Court.
In Towne v. Eisner,8 the Court held that a stock dividend was not
"income" within the meaning of the Revenue Act of 1913.' Two years
4. This Note does not undertake to analyze the effects of the 1969 Amendments on the
taxation of the distribution of stock rights, which is also controlled by § 305(a). Although
distribution of stock dividends and stock rights are similar in some respects, there are substantial
differences in taxation, history, and policy considerations that would require an extension of this
Note beyond acceptable limits in order to include a consideration of stock rights. For a brief
discussion of the taxation of stock rights see notes 148-54 infra and accompanying text.
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI provides: "The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect
taxes on income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States,
and without regard to any census of enumeration."
6. "[]he net income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits, and income derived from
. . .dividends. .. Provided, that the term "dividends" as used in this title shall be held to mean
any distribution made or ordered to be made by a corporation . . . payable to its shareholders,
whether in cash or in stock of the corporation. . . which stock dividend shall be considered income,
to the amount of its cash value." Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 757.
7. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1890).
8. 245 U.S. 418 (1918).
9. "That there shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid annually upon the entire net
income. . . a tax of 1 per centum per annum upon such income.
Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16,
§ II(A)(1), 38 Stat. 166.
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later in the landmark decision of Eisner v. Macomber,'0 the Court
invalidated as unconstitutional a tax levied under the Revenue Act of

1916 on a distribution of common stock in respect to common stock."
The Court found that the stock dividend was not "income" within the
purview of the sixteenth amendment because the shareholder had not

derived a gain that she could employ for her own separate enjoyment and
benefit. The dividend shares, the Court concluded, were merely additonal
pieces of paper that represented the taxpayer's original investment, not
an increase in her investment. The Court also noted that the dividend

shares remained "in corporate solution" as an unsevered distribution of
capital, not income. 2 The Court concluded that the tax in question was a
direct tax on capital and therefore unconstitutional because Congress
had failed to apportion it among the states.
Although Eisner v. Macomber involved only a stock dividend of

common stock on identical stock, the decision was accepted immediately
as the basis of a broader exemption. In the Revenue Act of 1921,

13
Congress exempted all stock dividends from income taxation.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, however, made it increasingly
clear that this broad exemption was neither required nor intended by

Eisnerv. Macomber. In a series of cases in the early 1920's,11 commonly
referred to as the "reorganization cases," the Court upheld the taxation
of shareholders of acquired corporations who had received dividends of
stock of the acquiring corporations. 15 These cases made it clear that a
corporate shareholder realized taxable income when the corporation
10. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). For an extensive discussion of this case see Powell, Stock Dividends,
Direct Taxes, and the Sixteenth Amendment, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 536 (1920).
11. The stock dividend in question was a 50% dividend of common stock issued to the
common shareholders by Standard Oil Company of California. The shareholder owned 2,200
shares and received a stock dividend of 1,100 shares valued at $19,887. The Commissioner was
trying to tax this amount as income to the shareholder.

12. The Court's statement that the taxpayer had not received income because any gain
accruing to her had not been "severed" from the capital that produced it gave rise to the "doctrine
of realization." Under this doctrine, a taxpayer did not receive income until the gain was severed
from the capital that produced it. This "severence-realization" test was subsequently overruled by
the Supreme Court. Helvering v. Brunn, 309 U.S. 461 (1940). For a more extensive discussion of the
doctrine of realization and its present application see notes 120-34 infra and accompanying text.
13. Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, § 201(d), 42 Stat. 228.
14. Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134 (1923);
Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921); United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
15. The factual situation of United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921), is illustrative of
these cases. The shareholder-taxpayer owned 250 shares of common stock of E.I. duPont de
Nemours Powder Co. The corporation was acquired by the newly formed E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co. for $58,000 worth of common stock of the new corporation. This stock was then distributed
to the shareholders of the acquired corporation as a stock dividend. The shareholder-taxpayer
received 500 shares, which were taxed as income.
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distributed stock that gave him a greater proportionate interest in the
corporation than he possessed prior to the distribution. 6
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's position, every revenue act until
1936 exempted all stock dividends from taxation. 7 Furthermore, the
regulations promulgated under the pre-1936 revenue acts provided for an
allocation of the basis of the stock on which the dividend was declared to
8
the dividend shares.1
B.

1936-1954: Recognition of the "ProportionateInterest" Standard
of Stock Dividend Taxation

After fifteen years of tax-free stock dividends under Eisner v.
Macomber and its legislative progeny, the Supreme Court began the
erosion of this tax-free status in 1936. In Koshland v. Helvering,"9 the
Court held that a dividend of common stock on preferred stock was
taxable "income" under the sixteenth amendment.2 Although the Court
seemed to base its decision on the "proportionate interest" doctrine,
which emanated from the "reorganization cases," 2' the language of the
decision indicated that a different test was being applied:
[W]here a stock dividend gives the shareholder an interest different from that which
his former stock holdings represented, he receives income. [This] type of dividend is
taxable as income under the Sixteenth Amendment.?

Although it was clear from this decision that a new doctrine of stock
dividend taxation had been enunciated, the precise nature of the doctrine
remained uncertain. Congressional reaction clearly reflected the
16. See Rottschaffer, Present Taxable Status of Stock Dividends in Federal Tax Law, 28
MINN. L. REv. 163, 170 (1943).

17. See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 201(0, 43 Stat. 255; Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27,
§ 201(f), 44 Stat. 11; Act of May 29, 1928, ch. 852, § 115(f), 45 Stat. 822; Act of June 6, 1932, ch.
209, § 115(f),47 Stat. 204; Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, § 115(f),48 Stat. 712.
18.

3 CuM. BULL. 38 (1920).

19. 298 U.S. 441 (1936).
20. In this case, the primary issue was whether the basis of the taxpayer's preferred stock,
which had been sold, was allocable to the common shares that she had received as a stock dividend
on the preferred stock. The determinative factor in the resolution of the issue was whether the stock
dividend of common stock was "income." This question was important because the Secretary of
Treasury lacked authority to reduce the cost basis of a capital gain asset by a proportionate part of
the income generated by the asset, since the taxation of capital gain income is based solely on the
cost of the capital gain asset. Id. at 447. Therefore, if the stock dividend shares were considered
income, there would be no allocation of the basis of the shareholder's preferred shares and her
capital gain would remain the same, rather than resulting in a greater gain if the basis of the
preferred stock were allocated to the common shares.
21. Id. at 445; see notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
22. 298 U.S. at 446 (emphasis added).
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prevailing confusion. The Revenue Act of 1936 hedged on the question of
whether stock dividends were taxable income and ambiguously stated:
A distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders in its stock or in rights to
acquire its stock shall not be treated as a dividend to the extent that it does not
constitute income to the shareholder within the meaning of the Sixteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.Y

As a result of this legislation and its subsequent re-enactment in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939,7A the courts were delegated the task of
differentiating between taxable and nontaxable stock dividends.
In undertaking to articulate a precise standard of stock dividend
taxation, the courts initially confronted the dilemma of choosing
between two existing, antipodal standards. The first rule, enunciated in
Koshland, provided that a stock dividend was taxable if it represented an
interest "different" from the interest formerly possessed by the
shareholder. 25 This test was very stringent in its application and
encompassed practically all stock dividends except an Eisner commonon-common dividend. A dividend of preferred stock on common stock,
for example, was taxable because the preferred stock represented an
interest different from that formerly held by the shareholder.26 The
second standard, which was first defined in the "reorganization cases" z
and in Eisner v. Macomber,2 stated that a stock dividend was taxable
only if it represented an increase in the shareholder's proportionate
interest in the corporation. The application of this test was not as
exacting as the "different interest" standard since a shareholder could
receive a tax-free stock dividend that did not change his percentage
interest but nonetheless represented an interest in the enterprise different
from his prior interest. A stock dividend of preferred stock to the sole
shareholder of common stock, for instance, was not taxable income
because the shareholder's post-dividend interest in the corporation-100
percent-was no greater than his predividend interest-100 percent.29
The courts divided over the issue of which standard was proper. The
decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals clearly manifested that it had
23. Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 690, § 115(f)(1), 49 Stat. 1688.
24. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. I, § 115(f)(1), 53 Stat. 47.
25. See notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text.
26. Frank J. & Hubert Kelly Trust v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 1014 (1938) (stock dividend
of nonvoting, cumulative 7% preferred stock on common stock held taxable income).
27. See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
28. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). In commenting on the accounting details involved in the issuance of
a stock dividend, the Court stated that a stock dividend "does not alter the pre-existing
proportionate interest of any stockholder or increase the intrinsic value of his holding .
Id. at
211.
29. Dreyfuss v. Manning, 44 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1942).
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adopted the Koshland approach.30 Nevertheless, several federal courts
31
adopted the "proportionate interest" test.

The confusion resulting from the diversity of opinion among the
lower courts forced the Supreme Court to resolve the issue. In 1943, in
the companion cases of Helvering v. Sprouse and Strassburgerv.

Commissioner,32 the Court adopted the "proportionate interest"
standard. In rejecting the "different interest" test, the Court stated:
We held [in Koshland]. . .that the dividend was income, but we did not hold that
any change whatsoever in the character of the shares issued as dividends resulted in
the receipt of income. On the contrary, the decision was that, to render the dividend
taxable as income, there must be a change brought about by the issue of shares as a
dividend whereby the proportional interest of the shareholder after the distribution
was essentially different from his former interest.**

In Sprouse and Strassburger,the Court found that the requisite increase

in proportionate interest was not present in dividends of nonvoting
common stock on voting common stock and of nonvoting cumulative
preferred stock on common stock held by a sole shareholder.Y An

important point in the subsequent evolution of the "proportionate
30. See Helms Bakeries v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 308 (1942) (stock dividend of first and
second preferred stock on previously outstanding preferred stock is taxable when common stock
also is outstanding); Avalon Inv. Corp., 11 P-H B.T.A. & Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 42496 (1942)
(stock dividend of preferred stock on common stock taxable); Keister v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A.
484 (1940), rev'd sub nom. Sprouse v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1941), affd, 318 U.S.
604 (1943) (10% stock dividend of nonvoting common stock on voting common stock); Smith v.
Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 80 (1939) (stock dividend of junior preferred stock on common is taxable
when senior preferred stock is outstanding); Frank J.& Hubert Kelly Trust v. Commissioner, 38
B.T.A. 1014 (1938) (stock dividend of preferred stock on common stock taxable).
31. Sprouse v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1941), rev'g Keister v. Commissioner,
42 B.T.A. 484 (1940) (stock dividend of nonvoting common stock on voting common stock not
taxable); Dreyfuss v. Manning, 44 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1942) (stock dividend of preferred stock to
sole shareholder of common stock not taxable).
32. 318 U.S. 604 (1943).
33. Id. at 607-08.
34. A more interesting and complex example of the application of the proportionate interest
43195 (1943). In this case, the
test is found in Winton M. Blount, 12 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
corporation had 2 classes of stock, Class A and Class B, that shared equally in dividends. Class A
had exclusive voting rights and a liquidation preference, and it shared equally with Class B on any
liquidation remainder. Prior to a 30% stock dividend of Class B stock on both classes, there were
400 Class A shares and 100 Class B shares outstanding, and the taxpayer, Blount, held 200 shares of
Class A. Prior to the stock dividend, Blount possessed the following interest: 200/500(2/5) in
dividends, 200/400 (1/2) in liquidation preference and voting control, and 200/500 (2/5) in
liquidation remainder. Blount received a stock dividend of 60 shares of Class B; 150 shares of Class
B were distributed to all shareholders. After the stock dividend, Blount held an identical
proportionate interest: 260/650 (2/5) in dividends, 200/400 (1/2) in liquidation preference and
voting control, and 260/650 (2/5) in liquidation remainder. The Tax Court, therefore, held that
Blount had not received an increase in his proportionate interests and therefore no tax was due on
the stock dividend.
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interest" test was the substantiality of the proportionate increase. An
increase in a shareholder's proportionate interest did not constitute
taxable income unless the increase represented a substantial change.Y
Notwithstanding the explicit pronouncements of Sprouse and
Strassburger,the Court's mandate did not resolve all the problems in
this area. The most troublesome point was determining whether a
distribution effectuated a taxable increase in a shareholder's
proportionate interest when the corporation's capital structure was
different from the capital structures involved in Sprouse and
Strassburger. The Supreme Court's position indicated that the sole
factor was the percentage composition of the shareholder's legal rights
vis-a-vis the other shareholders. The Commissioner, however, refused to
acquiesce in the use of this criterion. He contended that a shareholder
realized taxable income if the stock dividend effectuated a change in his
proprietary interests in the corporation, such as his interests in dividends
and liquidating distributions. 6 The Commissioner, in essence, was
asserting the Koshland "different interest" standard. The basic
distinction between the two approaches was that the Supreme Court's
position focused on a percentage alteration in the strict legal rights of the
shareholders, while the Commissioner's position focused on the more
practical, pecuniary alterations in the shareholders' interests.
This difference of opinion was evident in the case of Wiegand v.
Commissioner.3 7 The Wiegand Company had declared a 50 percent pro
rata stock dividend on its two outstanding classes of stock. This
distribution increased the outstanding shares of Class A stock from
4,000 shares to 6,000 shares and of Class B stock from 24,000 shares to
36,000 shares. The Class A stock held exclusive voting rights and was
entitled to preferential treatment on dividends and liquidating
distributions. Although the stock dividend did not alter any
shareholder's percentage of ownership, it did change the shareholders'
proprietary interests in dividends and liquidating distributions. After the
distribution, the Class A shareholders were entitled to 36,000 dollars
annually in dividends before the Class B shareholders were entitled to
any dividends; prior to the distribution, the Class A shareholders had
35. See Daggitt v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 31, 34 (1954); George S. Woodward, 12 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem.
43184 (1943). In Woodward, the Commissioner argued that a stock dividend was
taxable because the shareholder's voting interest had increased from .00442736% to .00484879%. In
rejecting this argument, the court commented: "The statement of the contention suggests its answer.
The difference is negligible." Id.

36.

For a discussion of the Commissioner's position see 1 J. MERTENS, TiE LAW OF FEDERAL

IScow TAXATION § 9.91 (1969).
37. 14 T.C. 136 (1950), rev'd, 194 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1952).
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been entitled to only 24,000 dollars of preferential dividends. Similarly,

any funds available to the shareholders on liquidation were subject to the
preferential claims of 2,000 additional Class A shares. In light of these
facts indicating an increase in proprietary benefits, the Tax Court
accepted the Commissioner's argument that the shareholders had
received taxable income. 3 The Court, however, overlooked the fact that
some shareholders, who held only Class B stock, had been detrimentally

affected by the distribution and had received no beneficial increase in
their proprietary interests.39 On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the Tax Court on the ground that the shareholders'

percentage interests had not been altered.40 In other litigation arising out
of the same stock distribution, the Seventh Circuit applied the
"proportionate interest" standard and reached the same result as the
Third Circuit.4 These cases illustrate the difficult and complex problems
that were encountered and never fully resolved in the application of the
"proportionate interest" standard of taxation.
During this same period, the Supreme Court was confronted with
the fundamental issue of whether any stock dividend, even the commonon-common Eisner variety, should be exempted from taxation. In

Helvering v. Griffiths42 the Commissioner argued that a stock dividend
of common-on-common was taxable income within the purview of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939. 43 He contended that the stock dividend
in question constituted income according to the popular conception of
the term and that the theoretical basis of Eisner, the "severence
realization" principle, had been overruled as a constitutional

prerequisite.44 Although the majority of the Court did not specifically
reject these arguments, and indeed seemed hesitant to reaffirm Eisner,
the Court refused to sustain the tax on the stock dividend. The majority
reasoned that it was unnecessary to consider the validity of Eisner45 since
38. Id. For an interesting comment on the Tax Court opinion see Comment, Income
Taxability of Stock Dividends and the "ProportionateInterest" Test, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 999
(1950).
39. This point was noted by Justice Opper in his dissent in the Tax Court. 14 T.C. at 153-54.
40. Wiegand v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1952).
41. Tourtelot v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 167 (7th Cir. 1951). The percentage "proportionate
interest" test was applied in 2 later cases, in which the stock dividend was held taxable. Pizitz v.
Patterson, 183 F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Ala. 1960); Masser v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 264 (1953).
42. 318 U.S. 371 (1943).
43. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
44. The Commissioner contended that the principle of "severance-realization" had been
discarded by Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441
(1936); and by the "reorganization cases" listed in note 14 supra.
45. There was a vigorous dissent written by Justice Douglas, with which Justices Black and
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section 115(f)(1) of the Revenue Act of 1936, the predecessor of section
115(f)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, had incorporated the
Eisner doctrine." Although it appears that this decision reaffirmed
Eisner, a careful reading of the opinion leads to the conclusion that the
4
Court was limiting Eisnerto its facts. 1
C.

1954-1969:Section 305 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954

The enactment of section 305 of the Internal Revenue Code of

195448 marked the beginning of a new period in the taxation of stock
dividends. This section established a general rule of nontaxability for
stock dividends, which in effect represented a return to the method of
taxation that followed the decision of Eisner v. Macomber.41 Section 305

constituted an explicit rejection of the "proportionate interest"
standard, which had bred needless confusion in the preceding decade.,
The new provision was based on the policy decision that an income tax

was inappropriate when the shareholder's interest remained "in
corporate solution"-in the form of corporate stock.5' There were,
Murphy concurred. The dissenters sharply criticized the majority for misinterpreting the legislative
history of the Revenue Act of 1936. The dissent also approved the Commissioner's argument that
the "severence-realization" principle had been overruled. Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371,404
(1943).
46. In reviewing the legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1936, the Court quoted a
statement by Congressman Vinson, the manager of the House bill: "In no sense is this [section
115(f)(1) of the Revenue Act of 1936] an attack upon the Eisner [v.] Macomber decision." Id. at
380.
47. See Lowndes, The Taxation ofStock Dividends andStock Rights, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 147,
148-49 (1947). Another problem in the taxation of stock dividends, which arose during this period,
involved the application of the "election" exception. According to this provision, a corporate
distribution in cash or stock was taxable if the shareholders had an election to choose either cash or
stock. Act of Feb. 10, 1939, ch. 2, § 115(f)(2), 53 Stat. 47 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 305(b)(1)). Only a few cases were litigated under this provision. The Tax Court held that an
election available to only one shareholder fell within the statutory language "at the election of any
of the shareholders." Lester Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 255 (1950). The Tax Court also
made it clear that the requisite election privilege had to be manifest in the dividend declaration
issued by the corporation. Southeastern Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 1069, 1090-91 (1945);
Capital Estates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 986 (1942). Furthermore, the same court ruled
that the election proviso was not applicable to an election given to shareholders in a recapitalization
that qualified as a tax-free reorganization. Knapp Monarch Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 59 (1942),
affd, 139 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1944). See also I J. MERTENS, supra note 36, § 9.94.
48. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 305, 68A Stat. 90.
49. See I J. MERTENS, supra note 36, § 9.97; Bittker, Stock Dividends, Distributions in
Kind, Redemptions, and Liquidations Under the 1954 Code, 1955 S. CAL. TAx INST. 349.
50. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprintedin 3 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD.
NEws 4675 (1954). One commentator predicted that the "proportionate interest" test might arise
again in applying the "election" exception embodied in § 305(b)(2). Kumler, Corporate
DistributionsofStock: A Bird's-Eye View of the New Code Provisions,41 A.B.A.J. 29 (1955).
51. The Senate Finance Committee expressed this policy as follows: "Your committee has
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however, two exceptions to the general rule of nontaxability. First, a
distribution of a corporation's stock that was issued to discharge
preference dividends for the preceding or current taxable year was

included in the shareholder's gross income. 52 Secondly, a distribution
that gave the shareholder an election to receive payment either in

property or in the corporation's stock also was taxable.3 In comparison
with the prior law, this scheme of taxation was relatively simple and

straightforward;51 consequently, litigation in this area ceased.
This method of taxation allowed corporations more freedom in

fashioning and adjusting their capital structures. It became possible to
issue a variety of tax-free stock dividends, such as disproportionate

dividends of preferred stock on common stock and of common stock on
preferred stock. This greater flexibility, however, fostered attempts to
circumvent even the limited exceptions to the general rule of
nontaxability. Some corporations specifically devised intricate and
sophisticated capital adjustment schemes that enabled their shareholders
to benefit tax-free from transactions otherwise prohibited by the
"election" exception of section 305(b)(2). 5- Although there were several
plans that could be employed to achieve this end, 5 the two most popular
methods involved recapitalizations that allowed shareholders to choose

between distributions of cash or stock of the corporation. The "two
classes of common stock" plan, for instance, involved a recapitalization
followed the policy of the House bill allowing the distribution of equity interests in a corporation as
a dividend to the greatest extent possible. As long as a shareholder's interest remains in corporate
solution, there is no appropriate occasion for the imposition of a tax. Accordingly, the general rule
is that no tax is imposed upon the distribution of stock rights and stock dividends whether or not a
particular shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation is varied, but rather is postponed
through the application of the pertinent basis provisions." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44
(1954), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4675 (1954).
52. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 305(b)(1), 68A Stat. 90, as amended INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 305(b)(1) (Supp. V, 1970).
53. Id. § 305(b)(2).
54. 2 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GiFT & ESTATE TAXATION § 21.18A
(1970).
55. Several commentators during this period stated that these plans were excellent tax
planning techniques. See IRS Attempts to Stop 2-Classes-of-Common Tax-Saving Plans; Legality
Questioned, 5 J. TAXATION, Sept. 1956, at 178; Two Classes of Common Stock; One Gets Cash,
One Stock Dividend; A Useful Tax PlanningTool, 5 J. TAXATION, May 1956, at 312.
56. One method was the "periodic redemption" plan. Under this technique, the shareholders
were given the election to have the corporation annually redeem a small percentage of their stock.
The shareholder who decided to redeem his stock received cash for the percent redeemed; the
shareholders who decided not to redeem received a corresponding increase in their proportionate
interest in the corporation. For a discussion of this method as a possible way to avoid the
regulations adopted in 1969 see Levin, New 305 Regs Limit Tax Advantages of 2-Class Common
Stock, but Alternatives Exist, 30 J. TAXATION, Jan. 1969, at 2, 4.
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that created two new classes of common stock that shared equally in
dividends and liquidating distributions. One class, however, was limited
to dividends payable in the stock of the corporation, while the other class
was entitled only to cash dividends. The class that received stock
dividends also was convertible into the other class. When the
recapitalization plan was effectuated, the shareholders could choose
either class of stock. Those who chose the convertible stock that paid
only stock dividends then had the additional election to convert their
stock into the stock paying only cash dividends. 57 Another common plan
was the "increasing convertible preferred" method, under which the
corporation announced a recapitalization in which all outstanding
shareholders had the option of exchanging their stock for a special
preference stock. This new preferred stock only paid stock dividends in
the special preference stock, and all this stock was convertible into
common stock at an ascending ratio. After the shareholders exchanged
their old stock for the new preference stock, they had the further option
to convert into common stock and receive cash dividends or to retain the
preferred stock and receive tax-free stock dividends. 5
By 1956 the use of the foregoing techniques of adjusting capital
structures had so proliferated that the Treasury Department felt
compelled to propose regulations that would curb the use of these
plans."' The proposed regulations and several amendments thereto,"
however, were severely criticized as being outside the scope of the code
provisions authorizing their promulgation." They were not officially
57. A widely publicized application of this plan was employed by Citizens Utilities
Corporation. See materials cited note 55 supra.
58. This technique was used by the huge conglomerate Ling-Temco in 1968. For a description
of the Ling-Temco plan see Wall Street J., Feb. 14, 1968, at 20, col. 4. For a general discussion of
this plan see Levin, supra note 56.
59. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.305-2, 21 Fed. Reg. 5104-05 (1956).
60. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.305-2, 33 Fed. Reg. 12744-45 (1968).
6 1. The proposed regulations were criticized on the grounds that they were not supported by
the statute and covered many transactions that Congress had intended to be tax-free. The major
concern of the critics was the broad definition of "election" in § 305(b)(2). Under the 1939 Code
and its accompanying case law, the requisite election consisted of a shareholder's option to receive
cash or property on a particular distribution. Under the regulations' broad definition of "election"
(see notes 62-69 infra and accompanying text), the requisite election was considered present in many
situations that did not even involve a particular distribution, such as when a corporation had 2
classes of stock outstanding and a shareholder chose either to purchase stock of the corporation or
to exchange his stock in a recapitalization. See Lee, The Stock Dividend, 37 TAXEs 959, 967-72
(1959); Comment, An Analysis of the Taxation of Stock Dividends from 1918 to 1970: Effects of
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 on § 305 of the Internal Revenue Code, 8 DuQuEsNE L. REV. 364,379
& n.61 (1970). See also Levin, supra note 56, at 4-5; Ray, Stock Dividends: Section 305(b) and the
Conglomerates, 21 S. CAL. TAx INST. 341,364-75 (1969).
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adopted until January 10, 1969.62 The regulations were issued under the
two exceptions to the general rule of nontaxability embodied in section
305(a). Generally, they broadened the application of both exceptions so
that the tax avoidance techniques fell within the purview of one or the
other of the exceptions. Two general rules that encompassed a variety of
stock plans can be distilled from the explanatory comments and

examples set forth in the regulations. 3 First, under section 305(b)(1),
which provided that a distribution of stock was taxable if it was made in
discharge of preference dividends, the regulations stated that a
shareholder's stock would be considered preferred stock and any stock
distributed thereon would be considered as made in discharge of
preference dividends, when a corporation had two classes of stock

outstanding and when an annual distribution of stock was mandatory
for one of the classes. 4 This provision, therefore, subjected the
"increasing convertible preferred" plan to taxation.

5

Secondly, under

section 305(b)(2), which provided that a distribution of stock was
taxable if a shareholder could elect to receive the distribution in either
property or stock of the corporation, the regulations provided that the
requisite election would be considered present when any shareholder was
given, expressly or impliedly, a choice to receive either property or
additional shares of stock, irrespective of how or when the election was
exercised, and notwithstanding the fact that the election was never fully

exercised.66 This definition of "election" was considerably broader than
the traditional concept of the term;6 7 consequently, many heretofore
62. T.D. 6990, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 95.
63. For a detailed analysis of the 1956 and 1968 proposed regulations and the regulations
adopted in 1969 see Ray, supra note 61, at 352-55 and Comment, supra note 61, at 369-85.
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(b)(1) (1969) provides: "If, in the case of a corporation having two
or more classes of outstanding stock, the terms of one class requires, in all events, periodic
distributions with respect to it of stock or rights to acquire stock, then the stock of such class is
preferred stock. Such a distribution of stock or rights with respect to the preferred stock is a
distribution made in discharge of preference dividends."
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(b)(2), example 2 (1969), makes it clear that increasing convertible
preferred plans are subject to the "discharge of preference dividend" exception.
66. See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-2(a) (1969). Treas. Reg. § 1.305-2(b)(1) (1969) provides:
"Section 305(b)(2) refers to every election, whether express or implied, regardless of how or when
exercised or exercisable. An election is a choice to receive payment in one medium or another. The
point in time at which such choice is made, whether before or after the declaration, is immaterial as
long as at some point in time any shareholder, either by action or inaction, has made a choice which
permitted the corporation to distribute stock or stock rights with respect to some shares and money
or other property with respect to other shares. A choice to receive payment in one medium or
another may arise out of the terms of the declaration, the provisions of the stock certificate, or the
circumstances of the transaction. A choice may be exercisable directly or indirectly through action
by the shareholder or through his failure to act."
67. See note 47 supra.
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nontaxable stock plans, such as the "two classes of common stock"
plans" and the "increasing-decreasing conversion ratio" plans," became
taxable under section 305(b)(2). These regulations, however, did not

cover all stock plans under which a shareholder could elect to receive
property or additional stock; specifically, the "periodic redemption"

plan was not subject to taxation under the regulations.

°

Official adoption of the regulations did not toll the criticism that
had been voiced against the proposed regulations.71 The questionable

validity of the 1969 regulations and their inability to reach many
increasingly sophisticated stock plans undoubtedly were the major
factors that influenced the enactment of the 1969 Tax Reform Act
72
provisions dealing with taxation of stock dividends.

III.

SECTION

421

OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF

1969

The 1969 Amendments to section 305 of the.Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 represent an expansion of the exceptions to the general rule of

nontaxability of stock dividends. Whereas the 1954 Code broadened the
scope of tax-free stock dividends and rejected the "proportionate
interest" standard, the 1969 Amendments narrow the tax-free area and
reinstate the "proportionate interest" standard. This departure from

prior policy, however, was not unexpected since the policy considerations
supporting the 1969 Amendments are identical to the principles

embodied in the 1969 regulations, which were promulgated under the
1954 Code. The following explanation of the 1969 Amendments focuses
on an interpretation of the amendments, their accompanying legislative
history, and the proposed regulations. 7"
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-2(b)(2), example 1 (1969).
69. Id. examples 3 &4.
70. See Levin, supra note 56, at 3-4.
71. See id. 4-5; Ray, supra note 61, at 364-80.
72. See notes 61 & 71 supra and accompanying text. See also H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprintedin 2 CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
2332. The legislative
history of the 1969 Amendments manifests clearly that the revenue-producing potential of the new
law was not a major consideration for its enactment. The House Committee stated that the new
method of stock dividend taxation would produce about $2,500,000 per year. The Senate
Committee noted, however, that even though the new law would not be a big revenue producer, its
enactment would prevent a substantial revenue loss that otherwise would have occurred. See S. REP.
No. 91-552, 9Ist
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprintedin 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 2188 (1969);
H.R. REP. No. 91413, 91st Cong., Ist
Sess. (1969), reprintedin 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1660, table 6 (1969).
73. For additional explanation of the 1969 Amendments see 94 BNA TAX MANAGEMENT
PORTFOLIO: STOCK DIVIDENDS AND STOCK RIGHTS, at A-19 to -26 (3d ed. 1970), Libin &
Moorehead, Stock Dividend Benefits Restricted but not Eliminated by the New Tax Law, 32 J.
TAXATION, May 1970, at 258, 259-63, and Comment, supra note 61, at 385-90.
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The Operative Provisionsof the 1969 Amendments

The general rule of section 305(a)-a distribution of stock of a

corporation to its shareholders is not included in a shareholder's gross
income-is not changed by the 1969 Amendments. These amendments,
however, set forth the following distributions that will be included in a
shareholder's gross income as dividends under section 301 of the 1954
Code.
Section 305(b)(1) re-enacts the "election" exception previously

contained in section 305(b)(2). Under this rule, a distribution of a
corporation's stock is taxable if the shareholders have an election to
receive payment in either property or stock of the corporation. Although
the scope of this exception as it existed in the 1954 Code was expanded
considerably by the 1969 regulations, its applicability under the new law
will probably be substantially more narrow because the new sections

305(b) and 305(c) control the taxation of distributions previously
74
covered by the old provisions.

Section 305(b)(2) provides for the taxation of disproportionate distributions of stock. This provision represents a return to the "propor-

tionate interest" test since a disproportionate distribution is synonmous
with a distribution that increases the proportionate interest of a shareholder. Specifically, this section requires that a distribution of a corporation's stock shall be taxed as a section 301 dividend if the distribution,
or a series of distributions of which the distribution is a part, results in
the receipt of property by some shareholders and an increase in the
proportionate interests of other shareholders. 75 An obvious example of a
74. See Libin & Moorehead, supra note 73, at 259. The proposed regulations continue the
broad definition of "election" that was initially proposed in the 1969 regulations. Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 1.305-2(a), 36 Fed. Reg. 5222 (1971); see note 66 supra. The proposed regulations also set
forth 2 examples of the application of this section. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.305-2(b), examples (1)
& (2), 36 Fed. Reg. 5222 (1971).
75. The proposed regulations state that when more than one class of stock is outstanding,
each class is considered separately in determining whether a shareholder has increased his
proportionate interest. The individual shareholders of a class of stock will be deemed to have a
greater interest if the class as a whole has an increased interest in the corporation. Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 1.305-3(b)(6), 36 Fed. Reg. 5222-23 (1971). These regulations also provide that § 305(b)(2)
will not apply to stock distributions and cash distributions in lieu of fractional shares, provided the
cash was distributed to save the corporation the trouble, expense, and inconvenience of issuing
fractional shares. If the total amount of cash distributed annually in lieu of fractional shares is 5%
or less of the total fair market value of the stock distributed-determined at the date of
declaration-the distribution will be considered made for such a valid purpose. Id. § 1.305-3(c), 36
Fed. Reg. at 5223. The proposed regulations further provide that "a series of distributions"
encompasses all distributions of stock made or deemed made by the corporation that result in a
disproportion among the shareholders. Furthermore, in order for a distribution to be considered as
one of a series of distributions it is not necessary that the distribution be pursuant to a plan to
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disproportionate distribution is the "two classes of common stock" plan,
in which the corporation pays cash dividends on one class of stock and
stock dividends on the other class. 7 Another distribution taxable under
this section consists of cash payments to holders of convertible deben-

tures or preferred stock that do not contain antidilution provisions,

77
coupled with a common stock dividend to the common shareholders.
This distribution is disproportionate because the common shareholders

receive a proportionate increase in their stock interests when the interests of the holders of the convertible securities or stock decrease on
conversion.7" The proposed regulations, however, state that a dispropor-

tion does not result on this kind of distribution if the conversion ratio of
the securities or stock is adjusted to take into account the distribution to
the common shareholders.7 9 The proposed regulations further provide
distribute cash or property to some shareholders and to increase the proportionate interests of other
shareholders. A quarterly stock dividend to one class of stock and cash dividends to another class,
for example, constitute a series of distributions that violates § 305(b)(2). Id. § 1.305-3(b)(l)-(2), 36
Fed. Reg. at 5222.
76. The proposed regulations set forth several examples of taxation under "2 classes of
common stock" plans. When a corporation has 2 classes of common stock, Class A and Class B,
that share equally in the earnings and assets of the corporation, and the corporation pays a dividend
to Class A shareholders in Class A stock, and cash to Class B shareholders, the stock dividend is
taxable to the Class A shareholders since their interests in the corporation have been increased. This
is true even to those shareholders who may own Class A stock and Class B stock in the same
proportion. Id. § 1.305-3(e), example (1), 36 Fed. Reg. at 5223. If the 2 classes of stock are not
equal-Class A is common stock and Class B is nonconvertible preferred stock-and the
corporation pays a dividend to Class A shareholders in Class B stock, and cash to Class B
shareholders, the stock dividend is taxable since the Class A shareholders have increased their
interests in the corporation. Id. at example (3). If the stock dividend in the preceding example were
made in Class A stock instead of Class B stock, the dividend would not be taxable since the Class A
shareholders have not increased their proportionate interests in the corporation. Id. at example (2).
77. Id. at example (4). In this example the corporation has a class of common stock and
outstanding convertible securities that do not contain an antidilution provision. The corporation
distributes to the common shareholders rights to acquire the common stock. The distribution of the
rights is taxable because the proportionate interests of the shareholders are increased. This same
reasoning is applicable to a stock dividend of common stock to the common shareholders. The
taxation of this kind of distribution as a disproportionate distribution derives from the new
definition of shareholders in § 305(d)(2), which provides: "For the purpose of subsections (b) and
(c), the term 'shareholder' includes a holder of rights or of convertible securities." In practice, the
great majority of convertible securities and stock contain antidilution provisions. If these provisions
were not included, the convertible securities or stock would have little value because the interest in
common stock that they represent could be diluted to an insignificant amount by successive stock
dividends on the outstanding common stock. Since most convertible securities and stock contain
antidilution provisions, the example posed by the regulations probably will rarely occur.
78. See notes 157-58 infra and accompanying text.
79. Proposed Treas Reg. § 1.305-3(e), example (4)(ii), 36 Fed. Reg. 5223 (1971). The
proposed regulations, however, place several requirements on the exercise of these adjustments. For
this kind of distribution and adjustment of conversion ratio to be nondisproportionate the
adjustment must be made no later than the earlier of: (1) 3 years after the date of the stock dividend;
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that it is not necessary that both elements of this section-receipt of
cash or property by some shareholders and an increase in proportionate

interests of other shareholders-occur in the form of a distribution or
series of distributions. If a corporation, for example, distributes stock to
its shareholders, and a related corporation, pursuant to a prearranged

plan, purchases this stock from those shareholders who want to obtain
cash, a taxable disproportionate distribution results." ° The proposed

regulations also provide that noncontemporaneous distributions that
occur within 36 months of each other or pursuant to a prearranged plan,
irrespective of the dates of the distributions, will be "tacked" together
for section 305(b)(2) purposes. 81 Under the regulations, therefore, a
stock dividend of common-on-common, issued within 36 months of a

cash payment on either convertible securities or stock that do not contain an antidilution provision, will be taxable as a disproportionate
distribution.
Section 305(b)(3) establishes the principle that a distribution of a
corporation's stock is considered a section 301 dividend if some common
shareholders receive preferred stock and others receive common stock.
Under this section, it seems that all shareholders who receive such a
stock dividend will be taxed on the receipt of the stock.82 Moreover,

distributions on preferred stock are brought within the sphere of
taxation by section 305(b)(4), unless the distribution takes the form of
or (2) the date that the aggregate stock dividends, for which adjustment of the conversion ratio has
not previously been made, total at least 3% of the stock issued and outstanding on the date of the
first stock dividend. Id. § 1.305-3(d(1), 36 Fed. Reg. at 5223. This latter requisite refers to a
convertible stock or security that is adjustable only when several small stock dividends or stock
splits on the common stock total 3%. Suppose, for example, that a corporation issues convertible
stock and then, in successive years, issues an annual stock dividend of 1%on its common stock. The
conversion ratio will not be adjusted until the third year, when the stock dividends aggregate 3%.
Although the annual, pre-adjustment stock dividends appear to be taxable since the convertible
stock was not adjusted to account for them, the proposed regulations state that these distributions
will not be taxable if the conversion ratio is later adjusted according to Proposed Treas. Reg.
§ 1.305-3(d), 36 Fed. Reg. 5223 (1971). Id. § 1.305-3(e), example (5), 36 Fed. Reg. at 5223.
80. Id. § 1.305-3(b)(3), 36 Fed. Reg. at 5222. The examples set forth in the proposed
regulations indicate, however, that a distribution is disproportionate only if it involves separate
distributions or transactions, one in property and another resulting in an addition to the
shareholders' proportionate interests. See Libin & Moorehead, supra note 73, at 261.
81. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(b)(4), 36 Fed. Reg. 5222 (1971).
82. Id. § 1.305-4(b), example (1), 36 Fed. Reg. at 5224-25. Evidently, even common
shareholders who receive preferred stock and thereby effectively decrease their proportionate
interests in some aspects of the corporation are taxed. The language of this section would appear to
encompass a recapitalization in which some of the common shareholders receive all the common
stock and other common shareholders receive preferred stock. Senate debate on this point, however,
clearly indicates that this kind of recapitalization does not fall within the purview of this section.
See 94 BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO: STOCK DIVIDENDS AND STOCK RIGHTS, at A-21 (3d
ed. 1970).
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an increase in the conversion ratio of convertible preferred stock in order
to increase the value of the stock by an amount equal to a stock dividend
or stock split on the stock into which the preferred stock is convertible.
This provisions is basically a re-enactment of former section 305(b)(1),
which provided that stock dividends on preferred stock were taxable if
they were issued in discharge of preference dividends. s3 New section
305(b)(4), however, encompasses more distributions than the old
provision-because its limiting condition-an antidilution increase in the
conversion ratio-is more narrow than the limitation in the old section.
The proposed regulations delineate an interesting example of the broader
application of this section. They provide that a distribution of preferred
stock that may be redeemed after a specified period at a price higher
than the issue price, which does not represent a reasonable call premium,
will be considered a distribution on preferred stock.8 Suppose, for
example, that a corporation issues preferred stock for 100 dollars per
share, and the stock pays no dividends and is redeemable in five years for
185 dollars. Ten dollars is considered a reasonable call premium. Since
the redemption price exceeds the sum of the issue price and the reasonable call premium by 75 dollars, this excess amount is deemed a substitute for the distribution of dividends on the stock and is therefore
taxable under this section."
Section 305(b)(5) provides that a distribution of convertible
preferred stock is a taxable section 301 dividend unless the shareholder
can prove that the distribution will not result in a "disproportionate
distribution," under section 305(b)(2). The proposed regulations give
several guidelines concerning whether a distribution of convertible
preferred stock is disproportionate. They provide that a distribution is
likely to result in a disproportionate distribution under the following
conditions: (1) When the conversion right is exercisable within a
relatively short period of time after the date of distribution; and (2) when
it may be anticipated, after considering the dividend rate, the redemption
provision, the marketability of the stock, and the conversion price, that
only a part of the shareholders will exercise their conversion rights.86
83. The proposed regulations state several examples of distributions in discharge of
preference dividends. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(c), examples (3) & (4), 36 Fed. Reg. 5225

(1971).
84.
85.

Id. § l.305-5(b)(1)-(2), 36 Fed. Reg. at 5225.
Id. § 1.305-5(c), example (8), 36 Fed. Reg. at 5226. The proposed regulations, however,

state that a redemption premium not in excess of 10% of the issue price on stock that is not
redeemable for 5 years from the date of issue will be considered reasonable. Id. § 1.305-5(b)(2), 36
Fed. Reg. at 5225. For other examples of the application of this section see id. § 1.305-5(c),
examples (2) & (9), 36 Fed. Reg. at 5225-26.
86. Id. § 1.305-6(a)(2), 36 Fed. Reg. at 5226.
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Under these guidelines, a disproportionate distribution might occur, for
example, when a corporation issues a stock dividend on its common
stock "ofconvertible preferred stock, which is convertible into common
stock within four months. The issue price of the convertible preferred
stock is slightly higher than the market price of the common stock on the
date of distribution. The disproportion results because the shareholders
who wish to obtain a greater interest in the corporation convert their
preferred stock into common stock during the four-month period, while
the shareholders who desire to obtain cash sell their preferred stock at
the higher price. This entire example is based on the premise that the
price of the common stock will not have risen sufficiently within the four
months to make it worthwhile for every shareholder to convert his
preferred stock into common stock instead of selling it at the higher
price. 87 This same distribution, however, would not be taxable as a
"disproportionate distribution" if the mandatory conversion period
were twenty years.88 According to the assumption made under the
proposed regulations, the price of the common stock will have risen
sufficiently over a twenty-year period so that every shareholder will find
it advantageous to convert his preferred shares into common stock. The
determination whether a distribution of convertible preferred stock is
disproportionate, therefore, will be a fact question, and it will probably
be extremely difficult for taxpayers to prove that a particular
distribution will not result in disproportion among the shareholders.
Section 305(c) grants the Secretary of the Treasury extensive power
to promulgate regulations under which shareholders will be deemed
recipients of taxable section 301 dividends if they receive increments in
proportionate stockholdings as a result of transactions that do not
involve distributions of stock. This section and the proposed regulations
indicate several "deemed distributions" that may increase a
shareholder's proportionate interest, such as increases and decreases of
conversion ratios,89 increases in and differences between redemption
87. H.R. REP. No. 91-413. 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 2 CCH 1970 STAND.
FED. TAX REP.
2332. See also BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO: STOCK DIVIDENDS AND
STOCK RIGHTS, at A-22 (3d ed. 1970). A similar example is set forth in the proposed regulations.
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.305-6(b), example (2), 36 Fed. Reg. 5226 (1971). The proposed
regulations also provide that this kind of distribution is taxable under § 305(b)(3), since some
common shareholders receive preferred stock-those shareholders who do not convert-and other
common shareholders receive common stock-those shareholders who do convert. Id. § 1.3054(b), example (2), 36 Fed. Reg. at 5225.
88. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.305-6(b), example (1), 36 Fed. Reg. 5226 (1971).
89. The proposed regulations set forth the following example of a taxable decrease in
conversion ratios: "(i) Corporation N has two classes of stock outstanding, class A and class B.
Each class B share is convertible, at the option of the holder, into class A stock. However, in
accordance with a specified formula, this ratio is decreased each time a cash dividend is paid on the
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prices,9" recapitalizations, 91 redemptions that are treated as taxable
dividends under section 301,2 and "any transaction having a similar

effect [disproportionate distribution] on the interest on any
shareholder." Although the examples set forth in the proposed
class B stock to reflect the amount of the cash dividend. The conversion ratio is also adjusted in the
event that cash dividends are paid on the class A stock to increase the number of class A shares into
which the class B shares are convertible to compensate the class B shareholders for the cash dividend
paid on the class A stock. (ii) A $1 cash dividend per share is declared and paid on the class B stock.
On the date of payment, when the conversion ratio is decreased a distribution of stock is considered
as made with respect to each share of class A stock reflecting each share's increased proportionate
interest in the assets and earnings and profits of the corporation. The distribution is a distribution to
which section 301 applies." Id. § 1.305-3(e), example (7), 36 Fed. Reg. at 5223. For examples of
taxable increases-in conversion ratios see id. at examples (6) & (7); id. § 1.305-5(c), example (2), 36
Fed. Reg. at 5225.
90. See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
91. The proposed regulations set forth several examples that involve recapitalizations. For an
example of a taxable recapitalization see Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(c), example (3), 36 Fed.
Reg. 5225 (1971). For examples of nontaxable recapitalizations see id. § 1.305-3(e), example (12),
36 Fed. Reg. at 5224; id. § 1.305-5(c), examples (4)-(6), 36 Fed. Reg. at 5225. Other than these
examples, the proposed regulations do not indicate what kind of recapitalizations will fall within the
purview of §§ 305(b), (c).
92. This provision was enacted to authorize the Commissioner to promulgate regulations that
will impose a tax on nonredeeming shareholders who receive increases in their proportionate
stockholdings through a corporation's utilization of a periodic redemption plan. H.R. REP. No. 91413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprintedin 2 CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 2332. See note
56 supra. The proposed regulations authorize specifically the taxation of a shareholder's increase in
proportionate interest that results from a periodic redemption plan. The following example is set
forth in the proposed regulations: "Corporation T has 1,000 shares of stock outstanding. C owns
100 shares. Nine other shareholders each owns 100 shares. Pursuant to a plan for periodic
redemptions, T offers to redeem up to 5 percent of each shareholder's stock each year. During the
year, each of the nine other shareholders has 5 shares of his stock redeemed for cash. Thus, C's
proportionate interest in the assets and earnings and profits of T is increased. Assuming that the
cash received by the nine other shareholders is taxable under section 301, C is considered to have
received a distribution under sections 305(b)(2) and 305(c) of 5.25 shares of T stock to which section
301 applies." Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(e), example (8), 36 Fed. Reg. 5223-24 (1971). The
proposed regulations also delineate the mechanics for computing the amount of the taxable
"deemed distribution" received by the nonredeeming shareholder. Id; id. at example (9). These
regulations, however, state clearly that isolated redemptions of stock that are taxable as dividends
under § 301 do not give rise to taxation of the nonredeeming shareholders. A 30% minority
shareholder, for example, would not be deemed to have received a taxable increase in proportionate
interests if a 70% shareholder redeems 21% of his holdings. Id. at examples (10) & (11). This
redemption, which would be taxable under § 301, indicates that not all redemptions taxable under
§ 301 will give rise to taxation under § 305(c). Since the language of § 305(c) refers only to "a
redemption which is treated as a distribution to which § 301 applies," a redemption that qualifies
for capital gain treatment under § 302(b) probably will not result in taxation of the nonredeeming
shareholders. The rationale for excluding § 302(b) redemptions is somewhat unclear since § 302(b)
redemptions, which are substantially disproportionate or terminate a shareholder's interest, will
often greatly increase the proportionate interests of the nonredeeming shareholders. As these
comments and examples imply, the treatment of redemptions and disproportionate stockholdings is
not totally clear.
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regulations are indicative of the scope of section 305(c), future
regulations may exceed the intended scope of this section, since the broad
and undefined language of the section could encompass many
transactions. Moreover, several questions are not fully answered by the
proposed regulations. What type of "recapitalizations" fall within the
purview of this section? What transactions are "transactions having a
similar effect on the interest of any shareholder"? Section 305(c),
therefore, may indeed foreshadow ominous consequences.
B.

TransitionalRules Applicable to the 1969 Amendments

The full impact of the 1969 Amendments is delayed by special
transitional provisions that were enacted with the amendments. These
provisions provide a limited grace period for corporations to readjust
their capital structures and stock dividend policies in relation to the new
law. Under these rules, the 1969 Amendments apply to all distributions
and deemed distributions made after January 10, 1969, except for
distributions under sections 305(b)(2) and 305(b)(4).13 Section 305(b)(2)
is not applicable to a distribution of stock made before January 1, 1991,
on one of the following types of stock: (1) stock that was outstanding on
January 10, 1969; (2) stock that was issued pursuant to a contract
binding on the distributing corporation on January 10, 1969; (3) stock
that is additional stock of the class of stock with the largest fair market
value of all classes of stock of the corporation as of January 10, 1969; (4)
preferred stock containing an antidilution provision that is convertible
into stock meeting the requisites of (3) above; or (5) stock that was
issued in a prior distribution described in the above sections. 4 This
transitional rule applies only if the following requirements are satisfied:
(a) the stock on which the distribution is made falls within one of the
first two categories above; and (b) the stock was outstanding on January
10, 1968, a distribution of property on the stock was made on or before
January 10, 1969, and a distribution of stock on the stock outstanding
on January 10, 1969, was made on or before that date. 95 This latter
requisite has been denoted the "lookback" rule. It was enacted to
93. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 421(b)(1), (2), (4), 83 Stat. 615. The
proposed regulations provide that the transitional rules applicable to § 305(b)(2) also are applicable
to § 305(b)(5), to the extent that the latter section requires a determination whether a distribution is
disproportionate. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.305-8(b)(1), 36 Fed. Reg. 5227 (197 1).
94. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 421(b)(2)(A), 83 Stat. 615. Subsection
(e) means that the stock in question was a stock dividend on previously distributed stock that itself
qualifies under the transitional rules as stock distributed with respect to stock described in (1)-(4).
95. Id. § 421(b)(2)(B).
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prevent the application of the transitional rules for section 305(b)(2) to
distributions by corporations that had no history of prior distributions
covered by section 305(b)(2).11 The application of the transitional rules
for section 305(b)(2) is further complicated by another set of provisions
that, if satisfied, terminate the effectiveness of the transitional rules.
Under these provisions, the transitional rules cease to apply if the
distributing corporation, anytime after October 9, 1969, issues
convertible preferred stock, stock that is not additional stock of stock
meeting the requirements of (3) above, or preferred stock without an
antidilution provision that is convertible into stock meeting the
requirements of (3) above.9
The 1969 Amendments set forth two additional transitional rules."
First, section 421(b)(4) of the 1969 Amendments provides that section
305(b)(4) is inapplicable to any actual or deemed distribution on
preferred stock made before January 1, 1991, provided that the stock
was issued pursuant to terms that were in effect on January 10, 1969.
Secondly, section 421(b)(5) provides that section 305 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, which was in effect prior to the 1969
Amendments, is applicable to all distributions made after January 10,
1969, that are exempted from the application of the 1969 Amendments
by the transitional rules.
IV.

EFFECT OF

1969

AMENDMENTS ON CORPORATE STOCK DIVIDEND

POLICY

The 1969 Tax Reform Act, which marks a new era in taxation of
stock dividends, may have far-reaching effects on corporate financial
policy. Although final regulations will ultimately determine the full
significance of the 1969 Amendments, it is possible at this point to
discern several consequences that may result from the 1969 changes.
This section will focus on an analysis of the impact of these statutory
changes on certain corporations and their normal stock dividend
policies. Specifically, the influence of the changes brought about by the
1969 Amendments is considered with reference to three types of
corporations: the acquisition-minded, growth-oriented corporation; the
closely-held corporation; and the widely-held corporation. In the
discussion of each type of corporation, both the size of the corporation
96. See Libin & Moorehead, supra note 73, at 260.
97. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 421(b)(2)(C), 83 Stat. 615-16. The
termination provisions, however, are inapplicable if the issuance of the corporation's stock
represents a distribution of a dividend on identical stock. Id.
98. Id. §§ 421(b)(4), (5).
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in terms of the number of shares outstanding and the corporation's
history of stock dividend distributions are important considerations.
Before an analysis is undertaken to determine which corporations
will be affected by the 1969 Amendments, an initial question must be
asked: does the tax treatment of a corporation's shareholders upon the
receipt of stock dividends affect the corporation's issuance of stock
dividends? Unless this interrogatory is answered affirmatively, there is
no necessity to proceed further with this analysis. Unfortunately, the
information on this point is rather scarce. The only extensive survey
directly in point, conducted in 1949, revealed that stock dividend policy
is dictated basically by economic factors, such as high annual earnings
and expanding capital expenditures." The survey concluded that except
for closely-held corporations, the relatively preferential tax treatment of
shareholders had little, if any, influence on stock dividend policy.1"
Although the conclusion of this survey cannot be dismissed, it cannot be
fully accepted when the same question is considered in the context of the
harsher tax treatment imposed by the 1969 Amendments. Under present
conditions, it seems reasonable to conclude that the adverse tax
treatment of shareholders will affect a corporation's decision on whether
to issue stock dividends. After an examination of the regulations issued
in 1969, which expanded the 9cope of stock dividend taxation, one
commentator intimated that the stock dividend policy of
"conglomerate" corporations would be affected by the taxation of their
shareholders upon the receipt of stock dividends. 1 1 Furthermore, a
limited survey conducted in conjunction with this Note revealed that the
adverse tax treatment of shareholders is a factor that influences
corporate stock dividend policy. 1°2 In light of these findings, it may
validly be stated that adverse tax treatment of shareholders under the
1969 Amendments will influence stock dividend policy.
A.

The Acquisition-Minded, Growth-Oriented Corporation

Since acquisition-minded, growth-oriented corporations have a
history of disproportionate stock distributions, they probably will feel
the greatest impact of the 1969 Amendments. As previously noted, some
99. Zang &Thompson, Why Stock Dividends Are Declared, 27 TAXES 883, 884-85 (1949).
100. Id. at 886.
101. See Ray, supra note 61, at 344.
102. A questionnaire concerning the effect of the 1969 Amendments was sent to 50
corporations that have recently issued stock dividends. Ten replies were received. Six corporations
indicated that adverse tax treatment of its shareholders would significantly affect its stock dividend
policy. The results of the survey are on file in the office of the Vanderbilt Law Review.
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growth corporations, during the past decade, have distributed their stock
by plans that in effect gave shareholders an election between the receipt
of cash or stock.0 3 These plans were devised to create a very attractive,
high value stock that would be valuable to the corporation in any future
stock acquisitions undertaken by it.'1 The regulations under the 1954
Code were promulgated specifically to arrest the increasing issuance and
distribution, through stock dividends, of this speculative, tax-free
stock. 10 5 The 1969 Amendments were similarly enacted to curb this
abusive practice. Concerning the adoption of the 1969 Amendments, the
Senate Committee on Finance stated:
In recent years, considerable ingenuity has been used in developing methods of
capitalizing corporations in such a way that shareholders can be given the
equivalent of.an election to receive cash or stock, but at the same time permitting
stockholders who choose stock dividends to receive them tax free. . . . To counter
the various devices by which the effect of a distribution of stock can be disguised,
both versions of the bill give the Treasury Department regulatory authority to treat
[such distributions as taxable.]'"

Under the 1969 changes, therefore, many of the heretofore nontaxable
transactions engaged in by growth companies will now result in the
receipt of taxable income to the shareholders. Since all these plans were
commonly used by many acquisition-minded corporations, the taxation
of the plans will probably impede their future use.
These stock plans, however, will not be completely eliminated until
1991, when the special transitional rules of section 305(b)(2) terminate. 07
The transitional rules applicable to disproportionate distributions are
especially important to growth corporations because several of the
frequently used tax-free plans, such as the "two-class common stock"
plan and the "noncontemporaneous disproportionate distribution" of
stock and property plan, fall within the purview of section 305(b)(2). The
transitional rules provide generally that section 305(b)(2) will not apply
103. See notes 55-58 supra and accompanying text.
104. See Ray, supra note 61, at 345-46. The stock created by these plans was an attractive
investment and frequently maintained a high market value for 2 reasons. First, this stock, either by
corporate policy or express provision of the articles of incorporation, paid an annual stock dividend,
a factor often interpreted by the financial community as evidence of sound stock. Thus, since the
price of stock varies directly with its financial soundness, the value of the stock was often increased.
Secondly, the election that the new stock afforded its holders-either to retain the stock and receive
tax-free stock dividends or convert the stock into common stock and receive cash dividends-made
this stock very attractive to investors and therefore increased its value.
105. See notes 59-62 supra and accompanying text.
106. SENAM COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., IST SEss., SUMMARY OF H.R. 13270: TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1969, reprinted in P-H FED. TAXEs REP. BULL. No. 47, at 54-55 (Nov. 20,
1969).
107. See notes 93-97 supra and accompanying text.

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

to distributions made prior to January 1, 199 1, provided the distribution
is made on certain previously outstanding stock and the corporation has
had a, prior history of stock distributions on the stock in question.'1
These rules have produced an ironic result since the very provisions that
were passed to stop the tax avoidance practices of growth corporations
have, to a certain degree, rewarded these corporations for their past
plans by prohibiting the tax-free use of these attractive stock plans by
future competitors."0 ' The framers of the 1969 changes predicted this
possible loophole because they provided that the prior law under section
305 remained applicable to all distributions subject to the special
transitional rules. The major fallacy in this provision, however, is that
the prior law may not be effective to subject these distributions to
taxation since the effectiveness and validity of the 1969 regulations under
prior section 305 are indeed questionable. 110 Effective restraint,
therefore, will be delayed until 1991 when section 305(b)(2) becomes
applicable to all distributions. Since growth corporations and their
shareholders are given favorable tax treatment by the transitional rules,
it will be to their advantage to study these rules carefully to insure that
they comply with all the necessary requirements.
B.

Closely-Held Corporations

The stock dividend policies of closely-held corporations probably
will be significantly influenced by the 1969 changes. This impact will
result primarily because closely-held corporations afford their
shareholders an especially fruitful area for tax planning, since the
interests of a relatively few amicable shareholders can be advantageously
adjusted without interference from minority, dissenting shareholders.
Although closely-held corporations have not engaged extensively in
formulating stock plans that circumvent the limited taxation of stock
dividends under section 305 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, these
corporations have utilized some of the plans that now fall within the area
of taxable stock dividends. Closely-held corporations, for example, have
probably utilized adjustments in conversion ratios and redemption
values, periodic redemption plans, and recapitalizations in order to
108. See notes 93-97 supra and accompanying text.
109. See Ray, supra note 61, at 382. Mr. Ray made a similar statement concerning the effect
of the 1969 regulations, which had a similar transitional rule with a 1991 termination date: "In

summary, what started out to be an attack upon certain 'growth companies' and their issuance of
the 'new securities' may have served to reward their enterprise by limiting the utilization of those
securities by new issues and by removing doubts until 1991 as to the tax status of stock dividends on

'new securities!'" These remarks are equally applicable to the 1969 Amendments.
110.

Ray, supra note 61, at 382. See also notes 61 & 71 supra and accompanying text.
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adjust favorably the stockholdings of their shareholders. These stock
plans and similar plans that have been used by closely-held corporations
to increase the proportionate interests of some of their shareholders will
now be taxable under the 1969 Amendments. Through careful tax
planning, however, closely-held corporations may obtain the tax
advantages made available by adherence to the transitional rules
applicable to sections 305(b)(2) and 305(b)(4)."'
C.

Widely Held Corporations

The 1969 changes in stock dividend taxation probably will have
little, if any, effect on the stock dividend policies of widely-held
corporations that have no history of or future plans for the
implementation of disproportionate stock plans. Most widely-held
corporations that issue stock dividends usually distribute pro rata
dividends of less than ten percent, characteristically about two-to-three
percent; 12 however, a larger stock dividend-twenty percent or
more-may be distributed if the corporation desires to reduce the per
share value of its stock.13 Furthermore, most widely-held corporations
are deterred from pursuing a stock dividend policy that increases the
proportionate stockholdings of only a few shareholders because of both
the pre-emptive rights doctrine11 4 and general policy to treat all
shareholders equally. Distributions of ordinary stock dividends are
usually motivated by the corporation's desire to retain funds for
expansion or to satisfy shareholder demands for dividends."5 The 1969
Amendments, therefore, will have little effect on most of these
corporations because the amendments generally subject to taxation only
those distributions that disproportionately increase stockholdings. The
widely-held corporations that responded to the survey conducted in
conjunction with this Note reported unanimously that the 1969
Amendments would not significantly affect their stock dividend
policies." 6 Widely-held corporations, however, must be careful not to
I 11. See notes 93-98
112. H.

supra and accompanying text.

GUTHMANN & H. DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY

SCHWARTZ, CORPORATION FINANCE

544 (4th ed. 1962); E.

136-37 (1964).

113. See H. GUTHMAN & H. DOUGALL, supra note 112, at 543.
114. 11 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5135 (perm.
ed. rev. 1958): "This doctrine of equality which underlies the pre-emptive right, if not the right itself,
clearly applies when a corporation increases its capital stock by making a stock dividend. It cannot
discriminate between stockholders, but each stockholder is entitled to receive new shares in
proportion to the stock held by him at the time the dividend is made."

115. See E. DONALDSON,
116.

CORPORATE FINANCE

625 (1957).

Vanderbilt Law Review Survey, supra note 102.
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fall within certain provisions that might be applicable to them once the
regulations are adopted. These provisions include: (1) taxation under
section 305(b)(2) of a stock dividend of common-on-common
accompanied by interest payments on convertible debentures or stock;
(2) taxation of recapitalizations and redemptions under section 305(c);
(3) taxation of distributions of convertible preferred stock under section
305(b)(5); and (4) taxation of distributions that give the shareholders an
election between property and stock under section 305 (b)(1).
V.

CHALLENGES TO TAXATION OF STOCK DIVIDENDS UNDER THE

1969

AMENDMENTS

The broad sweep of stock dividend taxation under the 1969
Amendments encompasses many shareholders who previously received
tax-free treatment on the receipt of dividend stock. Many of these
shareholders will undoubtedly respond by seeking to frame arguments
that can be utilized to avoid imposition of a tax. When shareholders
receive significant increases in their proportionate stock interest,
taxation under the 1969 Amendments appears immune from successful
challenge, since the increase would clearly fall within the current
conception of taxable income. 1 7 Under the 1969 Amendments, however,
numerous situations may arise in which it is questionable whether a
shareholder has received taxable income or has experienced an increase
in his proportionate stockholdings. When these cases arise, the
arguments set forth in the following sections may be applicable in order
to avert taxation.
A.

Nontaxability of PotentialIncome

Since the inception of a federal tax on income, courts have struggled
with the troublesome and elusive concept of taxable income. The judicial
opinions and scholarly literature concerning this issue, however, have
seldom mentioned the concept of "potential income." Although never
precisely defined, "potential income" may be described as an economic
gain that may accrue to a taxpayer on the occurrence of a contingent,
future event to be performed by another individual. When the concept of
potential income has been mentioned by authorities, their observations
have resulted in the inference that it is not taxable."' The paucity of
117. See notes 120-26 infra and accompanying text.
118. See Lowndes, Current Conceptions of Taxable Income, 25 OHIo ST. L.J. 151, 180-81
(1964). "The real difficulty seems to be finding a sufficient gain to justify the imposition of an
income tax. Of course, a right to income, or an appreciation in the value of property, represents at
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controversy and comment on this subject can be easily explained. A
taxpayer will seldom, if ever, report an item as income until he is certain
that the value will be forthcoming or until the funds are in his possession.
Furthermore, until the taxpayer reports income, the Internal Revenue
Service usually will have no way, short of a complete audit, to discover
that the taxpayer may have an income item."' The potential income
issue, however, is clearly raised in several instances by the 1969
Amendments, since they provide for immediate taxation of several items
that may give rise to taxable income only if a contingent, future event
occurs. Before proceeding to an analysis of the 1969 Amendments, it is

necessary to examine "potential income" in the context of current
concepts of taxable income.
1. Potential Income in Relation to the Concept of Taxable
Income.--Congressional authority to lay and collect taxes on income
without apportionment among the states proceeds from the sixteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. 2 ° The key concept in this
scheme of taxation is "income." A precise and all-inclusive definition of
this term that would be useful to the courts, however, has never been and
probably cannot be formulated.1 2 At an early date in the history of
income taxation, the Supreme Court recognized that because no

definition could encompass every possible situation in which income
might arise, the courts should decide the issue on a case-by-case
least a potential gain, and perhaps this is a sufficient basis for the tax . . . .This presents the
question of realization because there has been no completed transaction, as well as the question of
whether a potential gain is sufficient gain to sustain an income tax." Id. Concerning the taxability
of a stock dividend of preferred stock, several scholars have noted: "The shareholder has two pieces
of paper in place of one, but he possesses no greater interest than he had before, other than the power
now to move on to a tax advantage through a sale. Until he so moves, is the potentiality enough to
warrant treating the receipt of the dividend [as taxable income]?" See Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau, &
Warren, A Technical Revision of the FederalIncome Tax Treatment of Corporate Distributionsto
Shareholders, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 13 (1952).
119. Although the IRS can audit a taxpayer's income tax return in order to discover any
unreported income items, an audit will seldom reveal potential income items since these items are so
uncertain that they will not be reflected in the taxpayer's tax return or financial records.
120. Although the sixteenth amendment authorizes Congress to levy a tax on income, some
scholars have stated that congressional power to tax income also derives from U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl.1. E.g., Lowndes, supra note 118, at 159; Mullock, Current Conceptions of Taxable
Income-A Comment, 26 OHIO ST. L.J. 43,44 (1965).
121. In Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920), the Court enunciated the following
definition of income: "Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from
both combined. ..."This definition, however, was not extremely helpful to the courts in deciding
whether an item was taxable income. See notes 122-23 infra and accompanying text. The Eisner
definition did give rise to several other important doctrines of tax law, such as realization and
taxable gain. See notes 127-40 infra and accompanying text.
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approach. 22 Proceeding in an ad hoc fashion, the courts created a broad

area of taxable income that excluded few items.123 This expansive
approach can be attributed to the Supreme Court's interpretation of
congressional intent in the enactment of section 61 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.124 The Court repeatedly has stated that this
definition evidences a congressional intent to exert "the full measure of
its taxing power"'' 25 and to tax "all gains except those specifically
exempted."1 26
Although the breadth of the concept of income is expansive, there
are limitations on it. These limitations originated from the judicial
definition of income set forth in Eisner v. Macomber-that income is

'
"the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined."' 2

The most familiar limitation is the doctrine of realization, which evolved
from the language "derived from" in the Eisner definition. Under this
doctrine, an item is not realized until it has been "severed" from the

capital asset that produced it. This traditional doctrine of realization,
however, has been repudiated by many courts,as including those that
imposed a tax on stock dividends that increased a shareholder's
proportionate interest.12 Moreover, on several occasions the Supreme
Court held that taxable income accrued to a taxpayer even though the

gain remained unsevered and indistinguishable from the capital asset.Ix
122. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 407 (1946); United States v. Kirby
Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1,3 (1931).
123. See, e.g., Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956) (stock options); Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (punitive damages); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112
(1940) (assignment of bond interest coupons); Helvering v. Brunn, 309 U.S. 461 (1940) (lessee's
improvements); United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931) (cancellation of
indebtedness). One commentator has stated: "Today the Court's tolerance of the tax has reached
the point where it would be very surprising if anything which there was a reasonable basis for taxing
under the income tax was found to be beyond Congress' constitutional competence." Lowndes,
supra note 118, at 152-53.
124. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this
subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to)
the following items ......
125. See, e.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940).
126. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 349 U.S. 426,430 (1955).
127. 252 U.S. at 207.
128. See Hanrahan, A Proposalfor Constructive Realization of Gain and Losses on
Transfers of Property by Gift and at Death, 15 U. KAN. L. REv. 133, 155 (1967); Lowndes, supra

note 118, at 171-72.
129. See, e.g., Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936).
130. E.g., Helvering v. Brunn, 309 U.S. 461 (1940) (lessee improvements); Koshland v.
Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936) (stock dividends). In Helvering v. Brunn this point was made
explicitly clear: "The fact that the gain is a portion of the value of property received by the taxpayer
in the transaction does not negative its realization.. . . It is not necessary to recognition of taxable
gain that [the taxpayer] should be able to sever the improvement begetting the gain from his original
capital." 309 U.S. at 469.
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Even though the "severence" doctrine of realization is no longer
constitutionally required, 131 it is clear that an altered form of the
principle of realization continues as a prerequisite of a taxable event.
This new tenet of realization frequently has been expressed as an event
that establishes economic gain with sufficient certainty that it is not
unreasonable to tax the gain at that time. 32 In Helvering v. Horst, the
Supreme Court described the event as the "last step . . . by which [a
taxpayer] obtains the fruition of the economic gain which has already
accrued to him." 1 A more descriptive definition of this event, which
takes into account the economic objectivity that is the basis of income
taxation, states that it is an occurrence that measurably changes the
taxpayer's economic position.13 The essence of this concept of
realization, although not explicitly stated in the opinions, is the certainty
of the taxpayer's gain.
A second limitation on the concept of taxable income is the Eisner
requisite of a derivation of "gain."'3 Under this principle, an item is
taxable income only if it represents an increase in the economic status of
the taxpayer. Although a few courts have suggested that the necessary
gain may take the form of non-economic, emotional gain,'13 most courts
and legal scholars have stated that the required gain must confer or be
connected with an economic benefit accruing to the taxpayer. 37 Since an
income tax is a tax on increments to an individual's material wealth, it is
only logical to require that the gain affect the economic status of the
taxpayer. A taxable gain may be produced by a variety of transactions,
131. See generally Lowndes, supra note 118, at 171-72; Mullock, supra note 120, at 44-46.
132. See Lowndes, supra note 118, at 171-74, 182. Commenting on Helvering v. Brunn,
Professor Lowndes states that "the Supreme Court made explicit what had formerly been implied
when it declared that realization. . . require[s]. . . merely some event that freezes or fixes the gain
with sufficient certainty so that it is [reasonable] to tax it." Id. at 173.
133. 311 U.S. 112, 115 (1940).
134. See Muliock, supra note 120, at 46-47.
135. See Lowndes, supra note 118, at 162.
136. Cf United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962) (transfer of appreciated shares for release
of marital rights constitutes taxable event); Helvering v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. 216
(1937) (mortgagee realized income to the extent of the interest obligations applied to acquire
mortgaged property at foreclosure sale).
137. E.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (gain constitutes taxable income
when its recipient derives readily realizable economic value from it); Helvering v. Brunn, 309
U.S. 461 (1940) (while it is true that economic gain is not always taxable as income, it is settled that
the realization of gain need not be in cash derived from the sale of an asset); Simmons v. United
States, 308 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1962) (taxpayer realized taxable gain because he received a permanent
economic benefit). "The [whole] question is not whether there is a gain but whether there is an
adequate gain . . . to sustain the tax, the criterion of which is some sort of economic objectivity
.
... Mullock, supra note 120, at 46-47.
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such as cancellation of indebtedness,' 3s improvements to a building by a
lessee, 39 and the exercise of stock options. 4 ' Furthermore, in appraising
the nature of taxable gains, the courts have implicitly recognized that the
requisite gain must be one that the taxpayer presently possesses and
controls.
When "potential income" is analyzed in the context of these
conceptions of taxable income, its nontaxability becomes apparent. If a
taxpayer anticipates the receipt of an economic gain that is conditioned
upon the future performance of an act by another individual, prior to the
occurrence of that event any gain remains contingent and uncertain. The
future event that is supposed to "trigger" realization of income might
never occur. Consequently, a tax on this item should be constitutionally
permissible only when the income potentiality becomes a reality.
Suppose, for instance, that an individual owns a tract of land that he
offers for sale. A prospective purchaser informs the owner that he desires
an option to buy the property, which he will purchase if he can establish
sufficient credit arrangements. When the option is sold, the owner
clearly does not receive a taxable gain from the sale of the property; a
taxable gain arises only when the purchaser exercises the option and
signs a contract that fixes the legal certainty of the purchase obligation.
Until the purchaser executes the purchase contract, the owner possesses
only a "potential income asset" that is not taxable.
2. PotentialIncome in Relation to the Taxation of Several Special
Transactions.-Although the principle of nontaxability of potential
income has been accorded implicit recognition, courts generally have not
expressly acknowledged it. A more concrete recognition of this principle,
however, may be discerned by examining the judicial treatment of
several special items. The first example concerns the tax treatment of
stock options. Two Supreme Court decisions established the general rule
that a holder of a stock option realized taxable gain at the date the
option was exercised, not when the option was granted.' Under this
standard, the amount of the gain, commonly denoted the "spread," is
the difference between the option price and the fair market value of the
stock on the date the option is exercised.14 2 This rule was codified with
138. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §108,
however, specifically excludes a discharge of indebtedness from gross income under certain

conditions.
139. Helvering v. Brunn, 309 U.S. 461 (1940). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 109, however,
specifically excludes lessee's improvements from gross income.
140. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
141. Id.; Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945).
142. Cases cited note 141 supra.
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modification in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which established a
category of "qualified" stock options. Generally, the holder of a
qualified stock option, who has held the option for three years, realizes
income at the date the option stock is sold to the extent of the difference
between the option price and the sale price, and his gain is taxed at
capital gains rates.4 3 If, however, the option does not qualify for special
tax treatment and does not have a readily ascertainable market value,
the holder will be subject to taxation at ordinary rates on the date the
option is exercised."l The language of section 421(a) of the 1954 Code
and the regulations thereunder are subject to the interpretation that
Congress and the Treasury Department did not believe that income was
realized until the qualified option stock was sold or the nonqualified
stock option exercised.1 45 The rationale for the postponement of
realization of income from either a qualified or nonqualified stock
option is three-fold. First, the extent of the gain, if any, is uncertain until
the date of exercise, since the stock market is subject to rapid and
reversible fluctuations. Secondly, in the case of a nonqualified stock
option, the Commissioner desires to postpone any taxation until the date
of exercise in order to tax the appreciated value of the stock option at
ordinary income rates. If he taxes the option when it is granted at
ordinary rates, any subsequent appreciation will receive capital gains
treatment when the option is exercised.' Lastly, even if it is assumed
that there will be a gain when the option is exercised, it is uncertain
whether the holder will ever exercise the option. Concededly, the
uncertainty of the market value of the stock and the Commissioner's
desire to tax any subsequent appreciation at ordinary rates are the
paramount considerations that dictate the postponement until the date
of exercise; the uncertainty of whether the option will be exercised,
however, was undoubtedly a consideration in the formulation of the
present tax treatment. The origin of this later consideration can perhaps
be traced to the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v. Smith, in
which the Court stated: "If the options had never been exercised, the
143.

INT.

REv.

CODE OF 1954, §§ 421-25; see
§ 8.53(a) (1967).
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144. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6 (1969); see Frank v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 75 (1970).
145. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 421(a) provides that "no income shall result" on the
exercise of the qualified option, and the regulations governing the taxation of nonqualified stock
opitions states that the holder of the option "realizes" income at the date of exercise. See Treas.
Reg. § !.421-6(d)(!) (1969).
146. For an example of the Commissioner's position on this issue see Frank v. Commissioner,
54 T.C. 75, 97 (1970).
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optionees would never have received any additional compensation

[income]."1

47

A second example of the nontaxability of potential income may be

ascertained by analyzing the tax treatment accompanying distributions
of stock rights. Section 305(a) of the 1954 Code excludes from a

shareholder's gross income the value of stock rights received in a
distribution with respect to his stock, 4 " provided that the stock into
which the right is convertible also would have been nontaxable if it had
been distributed directly.' Even if the stock right is taxable, its value is
not included in the shareholder's gross income until the right is exercised
or sold.'5 0 Furthermore, this principle is applicable under the 1954 Code
and the 1969 Amendments'' even though the amount to be included in
the shareholder's gross income is determined by reference to the fair
market value of the rights on the date of their distribution. 5 2 The
postponement of taxation until the date of exercise or sale is based
expressly on the principle that a shareholder possesses only potential

income until he exercises or sells his stock rights. In Palmer v.
Commissioner, 5 the Supreme Court stated:
The mere issue of rights to subscribe and their receipt by stockholders, is not a
dividend. No distribution of corporate assets or diminution of the net worth of the
corporation results in any practical sense. Even though the rights have a market or
147. 324 U.S. 177, 180 (1945).
148. "[G]ross income does not include the amount of any distribution of the stock of a
corporation made by such corporation to its shareholders with respect to its stock." INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 305(a). Although § 305(a), as amended by the 1969 Amendments, refers only to
"stock", the general rule of § 305(a) applies to the distribution of stock rights because stock is
defined to include "rights to acquire such stock." Id. § 305(d)(1). A stock right is an option to buy
at a specified price unissued or treasury stock of the corporation issuing the right. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.305-1 (1969).
149. This exception manifests the distinction between taxable and nontaxable stock rights.
The distinction was derived from the distinction between taxable and nontaxable stock dividends
that developed under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Accordingly, the principle developed that
a stock right was not taxable if the stock into which it was convertible would have been nontaxable
if it had been distributed. A stock right to acquire common stock that was distributed to common
shareholders, for example, would not be taxable since it was essentially a stock dividend of
common-on-common. See Lowndes, supra note 47, at 157-58.
150. See, e.g., Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63 (1937); Choate v. Commissioner, 129
F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1942).
151. See 94 BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO: STOCK DIVIDENDS AND STOCK RIGHTS, at
A-40 (3d ed. 1970). See also Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 98 (1968).
152. See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-2(c) (1969); 94 BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO, supra
note 15 1,at A-40. Under prior law the amount of the taxable income resulting from a distribution
of stock" rights was the difference between the cost of exercising the right and the fair market value
of the stock at the date of issue or the date of exercise, whichever was lower. See Choate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1942).
153. 302 U.S. 63 (1937).
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exchange value, they are not dividends within the statutory definition .

.

.

. They

are at most options or continuing offers, potential sources of income to the
stockholders through sale or the exercise of the rights. Taxable income might result
from their sale, but distribution of the corporate property could take place only on
their exercise.'4

Another example of a situation in which a potentiality postpones
taxation is presented by the tax treatment of a recipient of crop rents.
Although section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 includes rents
in gross income, the regulations provide that crop rents are excluded
from gross income until the crops are reduced to cash. mA taxpayer who
receives crop rents obtains a valuable asset; however, the potentiality

that the crops may spoil before their disposition or may subsequently
bring a different price on the date of conversion demands that taxation

be delayed until the contingencies disappear. Commenting on this aspect
of the taxation of crop rents, the Court of Claims stated:
Crops received as rent exist in the hands of the lessor as a unique kind of property
which can be described, like a right to receive future income, as a potential income
asset. I"

3.

Potential Income and the 1969 Amendments.-When the

potential income analysis is applied to the 1969 Amendments, several of
154. Id. at 71 (emphasis added). In Choate, the court made a similar statement: "But the
options [rights] are merely offers to distribute such earnings. Unless and until such an option is
exercised, no distribution of corporate earnings occurs. .... The options are potential dividends
but, in and of themselves, are not dividends taxable under § 115." Choate v. Commissioner, 129
F.2d 684, 687 (2d Cir. 1942) (emphasis added).
155. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-4(a) (1969).
156. Davison v. United States, 292 F.2d 937, 942 (Ct. Cl. 1961). See also Tatum v.
Commissioner, 46 T.C. 736 (1966). The concept of potential income also was recognized by the
Court of Claims in 2 other cases. In these cases, which involved respectively the elimination of a
reserve for bad debt, and an exchange of accounts receivable for stock of equivalent value, the court
decided that a tax on income was appropriate because the potentialities that heretofore had
warranted the nontaxability of the income items had disappeared. Citizens Fed. Say. &Loan Ass'n
v. United States, 290 F.2d 932 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (in light of a recent decision by the Supreme Court, it
appears that a portion of a bad debt reserve may be considered as taxable income only if the
accounts receivable are sold or transferred at their gross value. See Nash v. United States, 398 U.S.
1 (1970)); Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d 524 (Ct. CI. 1961). Commenting on the case
involving the reserve for bad debt, one observer has said: "It appears from the opinion that the
Court of Claims conceived that the monies received by [the taxpayer corporation] and sheltered
from annual taxes by the reserve credits were indelibly stamped as 'potential income.' When it
appeared that the diverse contingencies upon which these monies might be lost to the corporation
would not occur and that the prediction of bad debts represented by the reserve account was
erroneous, the full potential for producing taxable income to the corporation had been achieved."
Garbow, "'PotentialIncome" is Being Taxed Under New Concept Evolving in Court of Claims, 16
J. TAXATION, Apr. 1962, at 206-07. Although these decisions stand for the proposition that untaxed
earnings subject to contingencies that may dissipate the item completely will be taxed when the
contingencies disappear, they can logically be cited for the proposition that possible taxable items
that may produce income if a future event occurs will not he taxed until the contingency occurs and
the income is realized.
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the distributions and "deemed" distributions that are subject to
taxation fall within the purview of the nontaxable potential income
concept. "Potential income," as it relates to stock dividends, can be
defined as a distribution or "deemed distribution" of stock that will
result in a direct increase in the shareholder's wealth or proportionate
interest in the corporation on the discharge of a future contingency by
another individual. The actual and "deemed distributions" taxable
under the 1969 Amendments that fall within this definition are: (1) pro
rata stock dividends of common stock to common shareholders
accompanied by cash payments on convertible debentures or convertible
preferred stock; (2) decreases in the conversion ratios of convertible
securities or stock; (3) disparity between issue-redemption prices; and (4)
distributions of convertible preferred stock. An examination of these
distributions clearly reveals the potentiality upon which they rest.
First, the proposed regulations indicate that under section 305 (b)(2)
pro rata dividends of common stock to common shareholders,
contemporaneous with interest payments or cash dividends to holders of
convertible debentures or convertible preferred stock that do not contain
antidilution provisions, will result in taxation of the common
shareholders to the extent of the increases in their proportionate holdings
of common stock. 157 Close analysis of the common shareholders'
position, however, reveals that they will receive an increase in their
proportionate interests only if the holders of the convertible issues
exercise the conversion privilege at a future date. Until then, the increase
in the common shareholders' interests is completely contingent and, in
fact, does not exist. The following example clearly illustrates this
potentiality. X Corporation has 1,000 shares of common stock
outstanding, held equally in 500 share lots by A and B. C holds 2,000
shares of convertible debentures, convertible at C's option at a four-forone ratio. If C exercises his option, the total amount of outstanding
stock will be 1,500 shares, which will make A, B, and C each one-third
157.

Since most convertible stock and securities contain antidilution provisions, the example

set forth in the committee reports and the example explained in this section will rarely occur. See
note 77 supra and accompanying text. When an antidilution provision, however, applies only to
large stock dividends, the distribution of a small stock dividend, contemporaneous with cash
payments to holders of convertible stock or securities, may result in taxation since there is no
adjustment of the conversion ratio. The paper manufacturing corporation, Boise Cascade, recently
encountered this situation. Boise Cascade had been paying annually a 2% stock dividend and its
certificate of incorporation did not provide for adjustment of the conversion ratios of its preferred
stock if the stock dividend were 2% or less annually. To avert possible taxation under the 1969
Amendments on the distribution of its annual 2% stock dividend, the certificate of incorporation
was amended to provide for the adjustment of the conversion ratios of the preferred stock on the
distribution of all stock dividends. 34 J. TAXATION, Apr. 1971, at 256-57.
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owners of the common stock. Suppose, however, that before C exercises
his option the corporation issues a 25 percent pro rata stock dividend on

the common stock, and an interest payment to C, making the total
outstanding common stock 1,250 shares. This distribution raises A's
and B's holdings to 625 shares, but A and B each retain the same 50
percent ownership. If C subsequently exercises his conversion privilege
and receives 500 shares, his interest will be diluted to a 28 percent
interest-500 of 1,750-and the interest of A and B will be increased to a
36 percent interest, rather than the 33 percent interest that would have

existed if the stock dividend had not occurred. If, however, C never
exercises his conversion privilege, A and B will not experience any

increase in their proportionate interests. 158 Commenting on the
questionable constitutionality of taxing stock dividends similar to the
above example, one writer has stated:
Since the determination of taxability must be made at the moment of the common
stock distribution, before any future conversions occur, it is difficult, from a
constitutional standpoint, to see how it can be said that the common stockholders
received anything other than more pieces of paper reflecting their identical, totally
unchanged interests in the corporation.' 5'

The taxation of common stock distributions also may be challenged

as a violation of the principle, established by Eisnerv. Macomber, that a
stock dividend of common-on-common is not taxable income. This
general rule of nontaxability has never been overruled, and it is codified
in section 305(a).1 0 This approach also may be sufficient to defeat the

Commissioner's attempts to tax another distribution under section
305(b)(2). When a corporation issues a pro rata stock dividend of

common-on-common, followed by a cash dividend on convertible
preferred stock within 36 months, the Commissioner may, in certain
situations, "tack" these noncontemporaneous distributions together
158. The conclusion that A and B have not experienced an increase in their proportionate
interest if C never exercises his conversion privilege may be subject to challenge on the ground that
C's conversion is irrelevant as far as A's and B's interests are concerned since C's convertible
debentures are considered the economic equivalent of common stock even though unexercised. See
APB Opinion No. 15 (1969). The equation of unexercised convertible securities and common stock
may well be justified when the convertible securities contain an antidilution provision because if no
dilution can occur, it may be assumed that the convertible securities will be converted into the
underlying common stock. If a convertible security does not contain an antidilution provision,
however, it cannot be assumed that the holder of the convertible securities will convert and obtain a
"diluted interest," especially if the convertible securities contain preferences other than the
conversion privilege. In this latter case the unexercised convertible security should not be
characterized as the economic equivalent of the underlying common stock.
159. Libin & Moorehead, supra note 73, at 263.
160. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 3 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4675 (1954).
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and tax the stock dividend as a disproportionate distribution. Under the
above rationale and precedents, however, a tax on the recipients of the
stock dividend would appear unconstitutional.
Section 305(c), which authorizes the taxation of shareholders whose
proportionate interests in a corporation are affected by a decrease in the
conversion ratios of convertible preferred stock, is another example of an
unconstitutional effort to tax "potential income." This tax evidently is
rationalized on the ground that a common shareholder's interest is
increased because the holders of convertible securities are entitiled to a
smaller percentage of stock if they elect to exercise the conversion
privilege. In this situation, however, any gain received by the common
shareholder is wholly dependent upon whether the holders of convertible
preferred stock or debentures choose to exercise their conversion
privilege. Obviously, if the conversion privilege is never used, which is
not unlikely when the ratio is lowered, the common shareholders realize
no increase in their proportionate stockholdings. One commentator has
stated:
It is difficult to discern the element of income that inures to the holders of common
stock when all that happens is that those holding senior convertible securities suffer
a reduction in their potential ability to convert their holdings to common stock. The
decrease in the conversion ratio would not appear-at the moment of decrease-to
have resulted in any economic gain to the common stockholders.,

Thus, until the convertible stock is converted pursuant to the decreased
ratio, the common shareholders have only a potential income asset that
is not within the scope of taxable income.
The proposed regulations under section 305(b)(4) provide for the
taxation of shareholders who are issued preferred stock that is
redeemable after a specific period at the election of the corporation or
the shareholders at a price higher than the issue price. This distribution
represents a gain that may accrue to a shareholder provided a contingent
event occurs. If the redemption privilege is vested with the corporation,
as it is in most cases,162 it is likely that the corporation will be unwilling
or financially unable to exercise the right, especially if the redemption
price is fairly substantial. At the date the shareholder receives the stock,
therefore, the proposed taxable increment-the amount that the redemption price exceeds the sum of the issue price and a reasonable call
premium-is only "potential income" and does not constitute a taxable
gain.
The taxation of certain distributions of convertible preferred stock
under section 305(b)(5) also is questionable because of the nontaxability
161.

Libin &Moorehead, supra note 73, at 264.

162.

See D. HERWITZ, BusiNEss PLANNING 297-99 (1966).
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of "potential income." As mentioned previously, a stock dividend of
convertible preferred stock may be taxable as a disproportionate
distribution if the conversion privilege is available for only a short
period. In this situation, however, any income to shareholders rests upon
the contingency that only some of the shareholders will exercise the
conversion privilege. At the date of distribution, the shareholders have
not realized a taxable gain because the only event that will give rise to an
increase in proportionate interest-other shareholders selling their
convertible preferred stock-will occur, if at all, at a future date.
Moreover, it is foreseeable that favorable stock market conditions might
encourage all shareholders to exercise their conversion privilege, in
which case there would be no change in the proportionate holdings of
stock.
In addition to the challenge that "potential income" is not within
the concept of taxable income, the taxation of "potential income" can
be challenged under the fifth amendment. The substantive due process
requirements of the fifth amendment preclude the federal government
from using arbitrary and unreasonable measures to obtain the property
of individual citizens.1 3 In applying this prohibition to the field of
taxation, however, the courts have adopted a strict standard for
determining unreasonableness. In order for a taxpayer to prevail, he
must show that the tax in question is "a wholly arbitrary thing...
unrelated to privilege or benefit.""' It could be argued that the taxation
of "potential income" under section 305 is palpably unreasonable and
therefore violates the fifth amendment's substantive due process
requirements.Iu Although the courts traditionally have been unreceptive
to similar challenges to federal tax laws, the soundness and
reasonableness of this argument might prove persuasive to future courts.
Although many shareholders may be in a position to challenge
taxation of stock dividends and "deemed distributions," these
shareholders should realize that several disadvantages may result from
the successful use of these arguments. Since the basis of these arguments
is the potential nature of the gain, it logically follows that a shareholder
holding potential income items receives taxable income when the
163. See I C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3:11 (1969); 16A C.J.S.
ConstitutionalLaw § 568(b)(1) (1956).
164. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 679 (1933).
165. This approach was perhaps suggested by Professor Lowndes when he stated: "From this
point of view the constitutionality of taxing a particular item as income resolves itself into an
inquiry into whether congress has acted reasonably in imposing the tax." See Lowndes, supra note
118, at 182.
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potentiality disappears. At this date, the shareholder realizes income to
the extent of the fair market value of the stock, taxable at ordinary
income rates, and the Commissioner will undoubtedly take this
position. 66 Taxation in this manner would be detrimental to a
shareholder if the stock had appreciated in value since the distribution
date. If the distribution had been taxed on the date it was made, the
shareholder would have been taxed at ordinary income rates on the
stock's current fair market value, and any subsequent appreciation in
value would have been taxed at capital gains rates. Delaying taxation
until the potentiality disappears, however, results in the shareholder
losing favorable capital gains treatment on the appreciated value. It is
advisable, therefore, for shareholders who receive an actual stock
dividend and foresee its appreciation to refrain from challenging any
attempt to immediately tax the distribution.
The postponement of taxation on a stock distribution, however, will
be advantageous to other shareholders. A shareholder who believes the
potentiality will never disappear, for example, will certainly want to
challenge attempted taxation at the date of distribution. A shareholder
might fall within this category if he receives stock with a wide disparity
between the issue price and the redemption price and if he suspects that
the corporation will never redeem his stock. Moreover, if the distribution
in question involves stock that may depreciate in value, shareholders
would be wise to try to postpone the tax until the stock's value is less
than its value at the date of distribution. Further, shareholders who
receive "deemed distributions" should challenge the initial taxation. By
postponing the tax, these shareholders are not foregoing favorable
capital gains treatment since they received no new tangible asset that
they can subsequently sell.'6 7 Additionally, the possibility always exists
that the stock underlying the "deemed distribution" will depreciate in
value, which will reduce the value of the distribution when it is taxed.
Furthermore, those shareholders who find it inconvenient to absorb
additional income at the date of distribution will want to challenge any
initial taxation of the distribution.
166. The Commissioner takes a similar position on the taxation of stock options that do not
have readily ascertainable market values. See note 146 supra.
167. Shareholders in this category, however, should note that they may in effect be foregoing
capital gains treatment by the postponement of a tax if the Commissioner asserts the following
argument: the percentage increase in proportionate interest "deemed" to the shareholder becomes a
part of the value of his stock and, upon the subsequent sale of that stock, the portion of the proceeds
equal to the percentage increase is taxable at ordinary income rates, with only the remainder of the
proceeds taxable at capital gains rates.
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Challenges to the Commissioner's Determination of Increases in
ProportionateInterests

The 1969 Amendments reinstate the "proportionate interest"
standard of stock dividend taxation. Although this standard is the basis
of all the 1969 Amendments, sections 305(b)(2), 305(b)(5), and 305(c)
are the only provisions that expressly specify that shareholders who
receive increases in their proportionate stockholdings realize taxable
income. The immense difficulty encountered prior to 1954 in deciding
whether a particular distribution resulted in the requisite proportionate
change will undoubtedly again plague the courts," s5 since the 1969
Amendments provide no definition of an increase in proportionate
interest. Several arguments against taxation under the proportionate
interest standard are available to taxpayers. First, a shareholder should
argue, in an appropriate situation, that he did not receive any increase
in his proportionate interest. This contention brings into direct
conflict the Commissioner's and the shareholder's methods of
determining the requisite increase. This antipathy, however, is not novel,
since it arose frequently prior to 1954, and the contentions of the parties
are familiar. The Commissioner probably will argue, as he did prior to
1954, that the shareholder experienced an increase in his proportionate
interest because the distribution increased his proprietary interest in the
corporation. The shareholder, on the other hand, will contend that the
proper approach is a strict legal percentage test, under which the
shareholder receives the requisite increase only if his percentage interest
in the corporation materially changes. Strong authority to support the
shareholder's argument is supplied by the companion cases of
Strassburgerv. Commissioner and Helvering v. Sprouse," in which the
Supreme Court expressly adopted the legal percentage test. Two Circuit
Courts of Appeals subsequently affirmed this standard over the
objection of the Commissioner. 7 0 Since these cases have not been
overruled, they should be persuasive authority to sustantiate the
shareholder's position.
Shareholders also can contend that although they experienced an
increase in their proportionate interests, the increase was not substantial
and therefore not a sufficient gain to support an income tax. The case
168. See Libin & Moorehead, supra note 73, at 264.
169. 318 U.S. 604 (1943). For a discussion of these and similar cases see notes 32-34 supra
and accompanying text.
170. See Wiegand v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1952); Tourtelot v. Commissioner,
189 F.2d 167 (7th Cir. 1951). For a discussion of these cases see notes 37-41 supra and

accompanying text.
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law prior to 1954 supports this position.171 Furthermore, during the
formulation of the 1969 Amendments the Senate Finance Committee
mentioned that a de minimis approach might be applicable to the
taxation of disproportionate distributions under section 305(b)(2).
Specifically, the Committee stated that a distribution should not be
taxed if it, together with all distributions during the prior 36-month
period, did not increase the shareholder's proportionate interests more
than one-tenth of one percent. 172 Although the Committee's maximum
limit of one-tenth of one percent appears somewhat arbitrary, the
principle cannot be questioned. If the increase in the shareholder's stock
interest is minimal, his proportionate interest in the corporation has not
really changed and he has, in effect, merely received additional stock
certificates that represent his same interest in the corporation. Under the
rationale of Eisner v. Macomber and the general rule of nontaxability
embodied in section 305(a), a de minimis distribution would not produce
taxable income. The following example illustrates a possible application
of this theory. Suppose a shareholder owns 250 shares of common stock
of a corporation that has 2,000,000 shares of common stock
outstanding. The shareholder holds a one-eightieth of one percent
interest in the corporation. If he receives or is "deemed" to receive a
disproportionate distribution of 250 shares of common stock, his
interest will be increased by one-eightieth of one percent, giving him an
interest of approximately one-fortieth of one percent. Although the
shareholder might experience a sizeable economic benefit as a result of
this distribution, if the stock he receives maintains a high market value,
under the de minimis approach the increase in his proportionate interest
would be too insubstantial to warrant the imposition of a tax. 173
VI.

CONCLUSION

The 1969 Amendments mark the beginning of a new era in the
taxation of stock dividends. Although the full impact of the
Amendments cannot be determined until final regulations are promulgated, several general conclusions can be made at this time that will be
applicable irrespective of the positions taken by the regulations. The
1969 Amendments, for instance, will not significantly affect either the
171. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
172. See S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprintedin 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2186 (1969).
173. One writer apparently supports this view: "For example, how can taxable gain result
from imputing a stock dividend to a shareholder who has 10 shares out of 35,000,000T' See
Comment, supra note 61, at 391.
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stock dividend policies of most widely held corporations or the taxation
of their shareholders, at least as long as these corporations issue only pro
rata stock dividends and implement methods of capital adjustment that
do not alter the proportionate interests of their shareholders. On the
other hand, closely-held and acquisition-minded corporations that have
previously utilized stock plans to create disproportions among
shareholders will be significantly affected by the 1969 Amendments,
which were enacted specifically to arrest the present and future use of
these stock plans. Although some corporations will be able to qualify
their disproportionate stock plans under the transitional rules applicable
to 305(b)(2), many will probably find that these rules are inapplicable to
their plans and therefore will have to alter their current policy of stock
distributions. For corporations that desire to continue the use of
disproportionate stock plans, however, there are alternatives other than
the complete abandonment of their plans. The taxation of several
disproportionate stock plans, for example, is constitutionally
questionable on the ground of the nontaxability of "potential income."
Moreover, the Commissioner's determination that a shareholder has
experienced an increase in his proportionate interests may be subject to
attack in certain situations. If the taxation of a proposed stock plan is
open to challenge on these grounds, it might be wise, if the shareholders
agree, to implement the plan and litigate the validity of any resulting
taxation of the shareholders. Irrespective of the nature of a corporation
and its prior stock dividend history, all corporations that plan to issue
stock dividends or adjust their capital structure should carefully study
section 305 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. If planning
and study are not undertaken, the complexity and breadth of section 305
will unfortunately become another of the "tax traps for the unwary"
that are replete in the law of federal taxation.
JOHN ANDREW PICKENS

